Amendments to Dutch Export Control Regulations for Items Exported to Israel

On 7 April 2025, the Netherlands amended the Strategic Goods Decree to introduce restrictions concerning exports of certain sensitive products to Israel. The Dutch government revoked the National General Export License NL002 (“License NL002”) and amended the National General Export License NL010 (“License NL010”) and the General Transit License Regulation NL007 (“License NL007”). 

Background 

As explained in a letter to the House of Representatives of 7 April 2025 by Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Reinette Klever and Minister of Foreign Affairs Caspar Veldkamp, the amendment marks a shift towards much stricter scrutiny of all exports and transits through the Netherlands of military and dual-use goods to Israel, driven by the "current security situation in Israel, the Palestinian territories and the broader region." 

The amendments also follow the outcome of proceedings against the Dutch State before the Court of Appeal in The Hague on 12 February 2024 in an action brought by three non-governmental organisations (Oxfam Novib, Pax and The Rights Forum), that had ordered the government to halt the export of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel due to concerns about violations of international humanitarian law. The court specifically referenced Article 6a paragraph 3 and Article 13 paragraph 3 of the Strategic Goods Decree and Article 8 of General License NL009, interpreting these provisions as obligating the Minister in charge to halt exports in circumstances where foreign policy or security considerations preclude continued use of the license. 

The Netherlands is part of the F-35 programme, with the Dutch industry actively involved in the aircraft’s production, ongoing maintenance, and support. A regional warehouse for F-35 parts is located in The Netherlands, from which these parts are exported to various countries, including Israel. As these components are classified as military equipment and technology, an export license is mandatory for their shipment outside the Netherlands. Consequently, in 2016, General License NL009 was issued. This license permitted the export, transit, or transfer of goods covered by the F-35 Lightning II programme, originally including exports to Israel. 

Overview of the New Controls 

The regulation amending the Strategic Goods Decree introduces the following three changes:

• Revocation of License NL002: According to the explanatory note within the regulation, the License NL002 was revoked due to the current geopolitical context. Exports are now subject to individual assessments that previously fell under this license. License NL002 concerned dual-use goods, including related software and technology. Previously, the license allowed for the export of these goods under pre-defined conditions without the need for specific authorisation for each shipment. Following the revocation of this license, effective 8 April 2025, exporters must now apply for either a global or individual permit as referred to in article 12, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the EU Dual-Use Regulation 821/2021 (the “Dual-Use Regulation”) to export goods previously covered by License NL002.
• Amendment of License NL010: Israel is added to the list of countries in paragraph 2 of License NL010, effectively cancelling the general export license for information security items to Israel. As a result, these items can only be exported to Israel with an individual or global export authorisation. Previously, exports to Israel did not require an individual or global export license under License NL010. Export of information security items to Israel will now only be possible with either of these two types of licenses. 
• Amendment of License NL007: Israel is excluded as a final destination for the transit of certain types of military goods (as listed in the EU Common Military List, with the exception of the goods listed under Article 3 of License NL007) via the Netherlands, covered by the License NL007. These goods include, among others, components for military vehicles (excluding complete vehicles and high-level ballistic protection) (ML6), specific naval technology (excluding complete warships) (ML9), and certain military training equipment components (ML14), as well as electronic equipment specifically designed for military use, such as jamming and counter-jamming systems, secure communication devices, and military command and control systems (ML11). While previously the exclusion of items only related to items within the F-35 Lightning II programme, it now concerns all military goods. Military goods as they relate to the F-35 Lightning II programme are also explicitly excluded from this license. Individual transit licenses for military goods to Israel may still be granted, but will be subject to assessment against European arms export control criteria set by the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (the “Common Position”) (see below).

By removing Israel from the scope of general export licenses and general transit license, the Dutch government will now assess each transaction for the export and transit of military and dual-use goods to Israel on a case-by-case basis against relevant EU and Dutch legal frameworks.

Takeaways 

Companies involved in the export or transit of military and dual-use goods from the Netherlands to Israel will face stricter controls. The revocation and amendments of the general export licenses necessitate that all such transactions will now require individual or global export licenses. While individual or global licenses remain a possibility, companies should anticipate a more rigorous and potentially lengthier assessment process for exports and transits to Israel, taking into account European arms export control criteria and the prevailing political and security context. It is recommended that companies therefore conduct transaction-specific due diligence sufficiently ahead of time, including an assessment of their inventory to determine what items now require an export license while taking into account these lengthier processing periods in terms of shipments.

France Expands Controls on Advanced Technologies 

On 1 April 2025, the Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty (“The Ministry for the Economy”) extended its controls over exports of dual-use items related to quantum computing.  

Background 

French national control measures on quantum computing related goods were first established through an Order of 2 February 2024 (the “2024 Order”), alongside similar measures adopted unilaterally yet in coordination with  other Member States, including  Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Finland and Germany. In France, those measures are in line with the National Quantum Strategy launched in 2020 by President Emmanuel Macron, aiming to make the country a leader in this sector. The Ministry for the Economy noted that the measures were adopted as quantum technologies are reaching  a certain stage of maturity, making it suitable for both civil and military purposes, in particular for the development of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. 

In accordance with Article 9(4) of the Dual-Use Regulation the controls established by the 2024 Order were published in the Commission’s compilation of national control lists, alongside others adopted by Spain and the Netherlands. 

Overview of the Extended Controls

With its 27 March 2025 Order (the “2025 Order”) modifying the annex of the 2024 Order, France expanded controls to additional dual-use items related to quantum computing. While the 2024 Order, listed items such as quantum computers and components, complementary metal oxide semiconductor (“CMOS”) integrated circuits and dry etching equipment (mirroring national measures of other Member States), the national control list is now extended to include the following items:  

• Certain additive manufacturing equipment;
• Technologies designed to protect certain composite materials against corrosion;
• Certain integrated circuits not listed in the 2024 Order Annex; 
• Certain signal amplifiers; 
• Cryogenic refrigeration systems and components;
• Masks and reticles for extreme ultraviolet lithography;
• Cryogenic wafer testing equipment;
• Certain materials such as silicon, fluorides, hydrides or chlorides of silicon or germanium;
• Computers containing controlled components.

Unlike the Dutch authorities, the French authorities did not provide any National General Export Authorization for those items. As a consequence, French exporters are now required to apply for either an individual license or a global license. 

Takeaways

Companies that were already affected by the 2024 Order will likely consider the impact of these new controls to be minimal and expected. They should nonetheless ensure that their internal compliance policies and procedures are updated to add the new controlled items. Licenses will now be required for their export. Manufacturers and exporters of advanced technologies should however continue to monitor the developments of national measures which could become more usual and require a heightened level of attention. 

EU Developments on National Control Lists and Military Export Controls 

A. Commission Recommendation on Coordination of National Control Lists

On 8 April 2025, the EU Commission published Recommendation (EU) 2025/683 (the "Recommendation") aimed at improving the coordination and effectiveness of national control lists of dual-use items, which Member States can adopt under Article 9 of the Dual-Use Regulation. 

Background

This Recommendation essentially is a follow up on both the Commission White Paper on Export Controls, published in January 2024, which aimed to design a framework for practical implementation of Article 9 of the Dual-Use Regulation, and its European Economic Security Strategy, in which it called for more coordination between Member States in export control.

Article 9 allows Member States to adopt their own control measures for items not listed in annex I for reasons of public security. Those measures can or cannot consist of national control lists. In the latter case, they are compiled by the Commission and trigger article 10, paragraph (1) of the Dual-Use Regulation, enabling other Member States to use it as legal basis to implement their own control. 

To this date, only three Member States adopted national control lists : the Netherlands, Spain and France (see above). However, many more used article 9 to establish controls, without having recourse to lists, in particular in the last two years as Russia makes the most of the unanimity rule governing the Wassenaar Arrangement – the multilateral regime setting standard on dual use goods export control and on the basis of which Annex I of the Dual-Use Regulation must be updated – and slows, perhaps totally blocks the process.

Facing this increased use of article 9, the Commission sought to outline a framework for a more coordinated approach, stemming from the necessity to optimise the EU’s dual-use export control regime and prevent potential circumvention of controls through forum shopping. 

Overview of the Recommendation

The Commission recommends that Member States adopt a similar approach to the multilateral regimes ones – amongst which the Wassenaar Regime, acknowledging the fact they are deemed to supplement it – in both the assessment of the opportunity in adopting them (based on national risks and objective technical parameters) and the form of the list (with alphanumerical control code entries and technical notes). 

It then suggests a coordinated procedure for the adoption of national control lists, on a purely voluntary basis, made of mutual and continuous consultations in the process using the Dual-Use e-System (DeUS). 

Takeaways

Facing blockage of multilateral regimes, Member States are called upon to use more and more national measures, including national control lists but in a coordinated manner. To prevent the development of a  heterogeneous regime within the EU with a patchwork of national measures, the Commission calls for coordination. EU operators should  monitor these evolutions adopted in a scattered manner and allocate appropriate resources to trade compliance as multiple norms could apply to their operations.

B. EU military Controls Developments 

On 24 February 2025, the Council of the European Union (the “Council”) adopted a new version of the EU Common Military List, updating the previous one enacted a year ago. 

Background

The EU Common Military List serves as one of the means to harmonise export of military items in the EU. It indicates the items, both military and dual-use, that are covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP which defines common rules governing export control of military goods, in accordance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

As a result, the export of the listed items should be subject to a harmonised assessment, based on eight common criteria (minimum standards) to be taken into account by Member States when delivering licenses. 

Although the trade in arms, munitions and other war material remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States in accordance with Article 346 TFEU, making this Common Position a priori not-binding in this regard, dual-use goods are not covered by this treaty provision. The export of dual-use items is therefore being largely regulated by the EU. In particular, Article 15 of Regulation 821/2021 provides that Member States shall take into account Common Position 2008/944/CFSP when delivering an authorisation. 

Overview of the update

The following updates have been introduced: 

• Entry ML10 now also lists ‘sub-orbital craft’ and its equipment such as launch, recovery and ground support equipment, as well as the one designed for command or control. 
• Entry ML19, regarding Directed Energy Weapon now includes lasers designed to damage a target, and not only to destroy or effect mission-abort, unlike before. 
• A Technical Note was added under entry ML7.h providing several definitions, of ‘biopolymers’, ‘anti-idiotypic antibodies’, ‘monoclonal antibodies’, ‘polyclonal antibodies’ and ‘receptors’. Another defines ‘expression vectors’ under entry ML7.i.2.a. 
• A technical note defining ‘Automated Command and Control Systems’ under ML11.a, Note j. is now added. 

This amended list should constitute the basis for a new version of the Annex to EU Directive 2009/43 on defence-related products export that is expected to be published later in the year or early next year.

C. Council Conclusions on Arms Export Control

On 14 April 2025, the Council concluded the review of the EU framework for arms export control, by adopting a decision amending its 2008 Common Position. It reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to responsible and transparent trade in arms, to preventing its diversion and to building convergence of national arms export policies. 

It further stresses the importance of thoroughly assessing export license applications for military technology and equipment against the criteria stipulated by the Common Position as well as cooperation between Member States through the exchange of relevant information, especially regarding denial notifications and the launch of a database for licensing officers in May 2022. Such a coordinated approach contributes to the strengthening of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base’s competitiveness. It emphasises the importance of multilateral export control regimes, at a time in which, facing the blockage of the Wassenaar Regime, more Member States choose to use national control measures. 

Takeaways

EU operators whose items were already subject to the EU Common Military List will find the impact of this update minimal. However, new items might enter its scope, especially regarding sub-orbital crafts. A close look at the updated list and the descriptions is therefore recommended as well as necessary updates to existing policies and procedures.